If You've Got It, Use It (Simulation, That Is...) by Tucker, George & Frost, Chad
Source of Acquisition 
NASA Ames Research Center 
0 RASCAL UH-60 in-flight simd 
0 Simulation in support of safety 
e FailweRecovery Rating Scale develo 
0 Use ofF/R Rating Scale as a c 
* Flight envelope expansion without benefit of 
0 summary observations 
specifica.tion development - 
between simulation and flight evaluation 
simulation 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060053982 2019-08-30T00:02:58+00:00Z
2 
Large-scale motion sinmiation 
used to determine required level 
of automated FBW system 
safety monitoring 
Simulator 
- NASA Ames Vertical Motion 
Evduahn and Safety Pilot 
stations in separate locations 
- Multiple m&date flight 
control implementations 
investigated 
transients injected throughout 
the anticipated, opera’kmd 
maneuver envelope 
- Broad spectrum offailme 
eve f sgment 
Existing pilot rating scales (e.g., C-H Rating 
Scale) did not 
discontinuous nature of failure transients 
and subsequent recovery effort 
* FailureRecover Rating Scale developed to: 
- Describe effect of failwe transients on safety of 
- Allow correlatim of results with existing 
equately capture the 
flight and pilot recovery action 
airworthiness criteria to determine quantitative 
reliability design goals 
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ion of Failure Rat 
e Acceptability of a control system failure is a 
function of both: 
- The severity of the fdure, and 
- Its probability of occurrence 
U.S. and U.K., civil and rn3ta.q design 
documents used to correlate Failure ratings 
obtained 1ii.0~1 simulation with equivalent 
qyantitative probabilities of failure as design 
pidanEe 
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e Flight conditions: high hover and forward flight 
e Simulated single axis failure injections 
- All four cocErpit control axes 
- up to 100% of maximum RFCS S&O rate 
evaluated using the FIR Rating Scale 
Failure dynamics and required recovery effort 
Pilot reaction time vs. aircraft excursion evaluated 
In excess of 700 in-flight simulated failures 
Lateral Axis Servo Rate Monitor Disengagements 
Failwe Ratings 
, . . I  
Pilot-Provded 
Failure Ratings 
C 
D 
E 
Disengage Reaction lime [sscf 
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c ‘d  
* RASCAL funded to provide risk reduction testing 
for FBW upgrade of UH-60M 
* 60M control laws and control inceptors to be 
installed in RASCAL and evaluated using the 
Mission Task Elements of ADS-33E--at published 
altitudes 
- Arbitrarily-selected Illinimum engaged altitude to be 
replaced by “minimurn safe operational altitude” 
* With simulation not an option, a flight experiment 
was initiated to define the required minimum 
altitude 
M~~~~~~ 
Step 1: Fly each W E ,  unengaged, to define neeessay 
m ~ e u v e ~ ~  envelope 
Step 2: Identify attitude responses to a 100% servo rate 
hardover, with a 0.5 see disengage time 
* Step 3: Re-fly each M’IE, unengaged, with safety pilot- 
induced, simulated fdmes In most critical axis, at most 
critical time in maneuver 
- Maximum attitude change the sum of the required maneuver plus 
the worst case failure. 
- k4mswer &thde  decreased until pilet no l e~gz r  zcc~p@kg of
aircraft state changelrecovery requirements 
Final flare requires approximately +I4 deg nose 
attitude to terminate maneuver 
+27 deg of additional nose up attitude applied tu 
simulate a nose-up pitch hardover at flare termination 
Limit ground clearance approximately 10 ft agl 
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This kind of exploratory 
work is more 
appropriately done in 
simulation--when one is 
available 
- Eliminates risk to a 
valuable research facility 
- Test conditions more easily 
repeated for multiple 
subject safety pilots 
- Test data much easier to 
collect and analyze 
Lessons Learned f i ~ m  Envelope 
Determination (~~nt . )  
. Positive aspects of doing the 
envelope testing in the aircraft 
- The heviWe "failure 
recovery ?mining'' received by 
the subject Safety Pilots is very 
reatistic 
- The flight test environment 
provides a level of Safety Pilot 
stress absent from simulation 
under even the best of 
conditions 
- Safety Pilot subjects have a 
unique opportunity to validate 
the published envelope against 
their own codort leveL 
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Summary O b ~ e ~ a t i o ~ s  
0 High- fidelity simulation is essential for design 
specification development efforts 
Flight testing of the resultant hardware is, 
likewise, essential in a low risk environment 
return to high-fidelity simulation 
- Flight test for envelope limits, but always with 
True edge-of-the envelope testing is best done in a 
0 Absent the availability of simulation: 
sufficient step-wise build-up to ensure that the limits 
are approached but not exceeded 
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